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Using the staggered entry of Chi-X in 12 European equity markets as a source of exogenous 
variation in high frequency trading (HFT), we find that HFT causes significant increases in co-
movement in returns and in liquidity.  About one-third of the increase in return co-movement is 
due to faster diffusion of market-wide information.  We attribute the remaining two-thirds to 
correlated trading strategies of HFTs.  The increase in liquidity co-movement is consistent with 
HFT liquidity providers being better able to monitor other stocks and adjust their liquidity 
provision accordingly.  Our findings suggest a channel by which HFT impacts the cost of capital. 
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One of the most substantial changes in financial markets during the past decade is the 
proliferation of algorithmic trading (AT) and high frequency trading (HFT).
1
  While estimates of 
the scale of HFT activity vary depending on the market and how broadly HFT is defined, there is 
no doubt HFT accounts for a large share of trading volume in most developed markets.  This 
“rise of the machines” has triggered intense debate between regulators, practitioners, and 
academics about the effects of HFT.  Consensus is forming on some of the positive effects of 
HFT, with many empirical studies finding that AT and HFT improve simple measures of 
liquidity such as bid-ask spreads and are beneficial to price discovery.
2
  Less is known about the 
impact of HFT on stability and systematic risk in markets, including issues that have alarmed 
regulatory bodies, such as periodic liquidity evaporation, flash crashes, and volatility. 
Co-movement in stock returns and in the liquidity of individual stocks is an important 
aspect of market stability and risk.  Co-movement in returns determines the benefits of cross-
sectional diversification, the level of systematic risk, and therefore can affect companies’ cost of 
capital.  Co-movement or “commonality” in liquidity similarly attracts a return premium because 
investors dislike stocks that become illiquid when the market becomes illiquid (e.g., Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Anthonisz and Putniņš, 2017).  Co-movement also affects the way shocks are 
transmitted and thus the level of systemic risk.  An increase in co-movement could therefore 
offset some of the benefits of HFT such as increased liquidity. 
There are several reasons why HFT is likely to impact co-movement between securities.  
For example, HFTs tend to withdraw their liquidity when it is most needed by markets—during 
times of stress and large market-wide price movements.  Moreover, HFT strategies involve 
trading on asset mispricing across and within markets and the strategies of HFTs are similar.  
Such trading results in correlated demand for groups of stocks, which can increase in the extent 
to which they co-move.  HFT are also better able to monitor conditions in other stocks and adjust 
their liquidity provision accordingly, thereby synchronizing returns and liquidity across stocks.  
Despite these reasons, there is scarce evidence on how HFT affects co-movement. 
                                                 
1
 AT refers to orders and trades placed and managed by a computer that is programmed with an algorithm. HFT is a 
subset of AT that is distinguished by considerably higher trading speed, high order-to-trade ratios, and limited 
inventory positions, typically held for extremely short time periods.  Common strategies employed by HFTs include 
liquidity provision and various forms of arbitrage and quasi-arbitrage. 
2
 For example, see Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012), Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2013), Menkveld (2013), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014a), and Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordèn, 




We aim to fill this gap by analyzing the impact of HFT on co-movement in returns and in 
liquidity.  We investigate the time period of 2007–2009 for 12 European equity markets, using 
the staggered entry of Chi-X as an exogenous instrument for the level of HFT.
3
  The entry of 
Chi-X provides a good natural experiment because (i) Chi-X led to a substantial increase in HFT 
due to its low latency and “symbiotic relationship” with HFT (Chordia, Goyal, Lehmann, and 
Saar, 2013; Menkveld, 2013, 2016), and (ii) Chi-X began trading many different groups of 
stocks on many different dates, facilitating difference-in-differences estimation with many 
events.  The staggered entry of Chi-X allows us to control for potential confounding effects 
including time-series trends that are not related to HFT.  We also control for fragmentation.  We 
use daily consolidated order books and trades for the 12 European equity markets. 
Our main finding is that increased HFT activity leads to greater co-movement in both in 
returns and liquidity.  The increase in co-movement is economically meaningful; a one-standard-
deviation increase in HFT increases return co-movement by one-fifth of its mean and liquidity 
co-movement by two-fifths of its mean.  We also find that HFT substantially increases liquidity, 
narrowing spreads by almost one-half, and increases volatility. 
Several mechanisms could contribute to the increase in co-movement.  Using models of 
mediation, we shed light on their relative importance.  The quotes of HFTs are faster to 
incorporate market-wide information (e.g., Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014a), which 
is one source of increased return co-movement.  About one-third of the increase in return co-
movement is due to faster diffusion of market-wide information.  Isolating this channel is 
important because unlike other causes of return co-movement, faster diffusion of market-wide 
information makes prices more accurate without necessarily increasing systematic risk.  We 
attribute a small fraction (9%) of the increase in return co-movement to a “habitat” effect; 
increased liquidity due to HFT makes stocks more attractive to large investors that trade broad 
cross-sections of liquid stocks.  We attribute the bulk of the increase in return co-movement 
(56%) to correlated trading strategies of HFTs such as those documented by Chaboud, 
Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014), and Boehmer, Li, and Saar (2018). 
The tendency for HFT liquidity providers to withdraw from the market when conditions 
are unfavorable (e.g., Anand and Venkataraman, 2016) is a source of fragility that increases both 
volatility and co-movement in liquidity.  We estimate that this mechanism accounts for around 
                                                 
3
 Menkveld (2013) and Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) also use the introduction of Chi-X to study HFT, but they 




one-fifth of the increase in liquidity co-movement overall and becomes stronger during the 
period of high volatility in 2008–2009.  Our results suggest the main drivers of the increase in 
liquidity co-movement are the increased ability of HFT market markers to monitor conditions in 
other stocks and the correlated liquidity demand of opportunistic HFTs. 
The impact of HFT is not uniform in the cross-section of stocks.  We find that HFT leads 
to larger increases in co-movement in returns and in liquidity for medium and low volume 
stocks.  The stronger impact on medium and small stocks is consistent with the notion that prior 
to HFT, liquidity providers with limited monitoring capacity allocate less effort to monitoring 
information relevant for small stocks, where the stakes are lower (e.g., Lyle, Naughton, and 
Weller, 2016).  The increase in monitoring capacity brought about by HFT disproportionately 
increases monitoring of value-relevant information about medium and small stocks, thereby 
increasing their synchronicity with the rest of the market.  Non-uniformity in how HFT affects 
co-movement is also consistent with a habitat effect; an increase in the liquidity of medium and 
small stocks due to HFT increases the likelihood that they will be held by large institutions and 
subsequently co-move with other stocks held by institutions. 
Our results have implications for companies and markets.  Co-movement in returns and 
liquidity is a source of systematic risk that is associated with expected return premiums.  
Therefore, stronger co-movement can increase the cost of capital for companies and impact the 
real economy through the level of investment by companies.  However, because HFT also 
increases the level of liquidity, which can decrease required returns (e.g., Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986), the ultimate effect of HFT on the cost of capital is ambiguous.  What is 
unambiguous is that there are at least three channels by which HFT can affect the cost of capital: 
the liquidity level, co-movement in returns, and co-movement in liquidity. Stronger co-
movement also increases the tendency for shocks to propagate across securities, which can affect 
the level of systemic risk and the propensity for flash crashes.   
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
This section reviews the relevant findings of the literature on AT/HFT (for a more 
detailed review of HFT see Menkveld (2016)) and on co-movement in returns and in liquidity.  




HFT.  It then draws together insights from both areas to arrive at two hypotheses about the 
effects of HFT on co-movement. 
 
2.1. The effects of AT/HFT 
Much of the empirical literature focuses on the effects of AT/HFT on various measures of 
market quality, such as liquidity and informational efficiency.  For example, Hendershott, Jones, 
and Menkveld (2011) use the staggered introduction of automated quote dissemination on the 
NYSE in 2003 as an instrument for AT and find that AT has a positive effect on liquidity 
(reduces quoted and effective spreads).  They use the flow of electronic messages normalized by 
trading volume as a proxy for AT.  Our paper is methodologically similar in that it uses a 
staggered market structure change as an instrument and a normalized electronic message flow 
proxy, but in contrast, the market structure change that we examine facilitates HFT in particular.  
Our paper also differs by examining the effects of HFT on co-movement in returns and liquidity, 
rather than the level of liquidity.  Hendershott and Riordan (2013) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu 
(2015) find a similar positive effect of AT on liquidity in a sample of Deutsche Boerse stocks 
and a global sample, respectively.   
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) focus specifically on HFTs.  They develop an algorithm to 
proxy for HFT activity using trade and quote data and find that HFTs decrease spreads and short-
term volatility and increase depth.  Similarly, Boehmer et al. (2018) find that increased 
competition among HFTs, in particular market making HFTs, decreases short-term volatility and 
increases liquidity.  Menkveld (2013) analyzes the entry of Chi-X in the Dutch equity market and 
in particular the trades of a large market making HFT that subsequently commenced trading 
Dutch equities.  He finds that the HFT market maker displays many of the characteristics of 
traditional market makers, but has a substantial positive effect on liquidity.  Jovanovic and 
Menkveld (2016) use the same event to calibrate their model of equilibrium HFT and non-HFT 
trading.  They find that the HFT entry decreases adverse selection costs, increases trade 
frequency, and has a modest positive effect on welfare.  Our paper adds to this literature on the 
effects of HFT by analyzing the impact on co-movement in returns and in liquidity. 
The literature also generally finds that HFT has a positive effect on informational 
efficiency.  For example, Brogaard et al. (2014a) and Carrion (2013) both use a data set of 




conclude that days with a lot of trading by HFTs are associated with higher informational 
efficiency.  HFTs facilitate price discovery by submitting liquidity demanding orders in the 
direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction to transitory pricing errors.  
HFTs trade in the direction of macroeconomic news announcements, market-wide price 
movements and limit order book imbalances.  Chaboud et al. (2014) study AT in the foreign 
exchange market using a data set that clearly identifies computer-generated trades.  They find 
that AT improves two measures of informational efficiency: the frequency of arbitrage 
opportunities and the autocorrelation of high-frequency returns.  They show that AT strategies 
and trades are highly correlated. 
Although a number of regulators and practitioners have raised concerns about the effects 
of HFT on systematic risks, relatively little evidence exists to date.  Foucault (2012) concludes 
his survey of AT/HFT stating that the effect on systematic risk is unclear and more work is 
needed.  This is where our paper contributes to the AT/HFT literature by characterizing the 
effects of HFT on co-movement in returns and liquidity.  The degree of co-movement is an 
important aspect of market quality as it affects systematic risk, the propagation of shocks, and 
market stability. 
 
2.2. Co-movement in financial markets 
The extent to which stock returns co-move determines how effectively diversification, in 
the form of holding portfolios of stocks, can reduce risk.  Similarly, co-movement in liquidity, 
often referred to as “commonality in liquidity”, determines the extent to which variation in 
liquidity can be reduced by holding portfolios of stocks.  Because investors are concerned about 
liquidity (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002) systematic variation in liquidity 
(liquidity “risk”) is associated with a return premium.  For example, Acharya and Pedersen’s 
(2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM shows that co-movement in liquidity contributes to liquidity 
risk and thus attracts an expected return premium.  Therefore, co-movement in returns and in 
liquidity affects asset prices, required returns, and consequently can impact the cost of capital.   
A large number of empirical papers study co-movement or commonality in liquidity 
starting with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Huberman and Halka (2001), and 




liquidity in most of the world’s stock exchanges.  A commonly used measure of co-movement in 
liquidity is the R
2
 in a regression of a stock’s liquidity on market liquidity.   
Both demand-side and supply-side explanations for co-movement in liquidity have been 
proposed.  The demand-side explanations suggest that correlated trading demands and/or 
correlated sentiment cause co-movement in liquidity, e.g., institutional investors with similar 
investing styles may exhibit correlated trading patterns (e.g., Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016).  
The supply-side explanations suggest shocks to the funding liquidity or inventory risk of 
liquidity providers cause the co-movement and consistent with this view Hameed, Kang, and 
Viswanathan (2010) find that co-movement is stronger during market declines.  Karolyi, Lee, 
and Dijk (2012) use a global sample to test various explanations for what causes co-movement in 
liquidity.  Their evidence largely supports demand-side explanations, but does not rule out 
supply-side effects also playing a role.   
Our contribution to this literature on liquidity co-movement is in showing that a major 
determinant of the amount of co-movement in liquidity is the level of HFT activity.  The impact 
of HFT occurs through both demand-side and supply-side channels, for example, correlated 
aggressive trading and market making algorithms that are better at monitoring and responding to 
changing market conditions.  Given the level of HFT activity has grown in the past decade, our 
results are useful for understanding recent time-series trends in the level of liquidity co-
movement.  They also help understand cross-sectional variation in liquidity commonality given 
that HFT are more active in stocks with particular characteristics.  
The determinants of co-movement (or “synchronicity”) in returns have also been widely 
studied.  Co-movement in returns is not simply a reflection of co-movement in fundamental 
values.  For example, when a stock is added to an index its degree of return co-movement tends 
to increase although its fundamentals remain unchanged (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 
2005; Claessens and Yafeh, 2012).  Such findings suggest that various market frictions, 
imperfect incorporation of information in prices, or sentiment cause prices to temporarily deviate 
from fundamentals and influence the degree of return co-movement.  Claessens and Yafeh 
(2012) use a global sample to test various determinants of co-movement in returns.  Their 
evidence largely supports the demand-based explanation that co-movement is driven by 




“information diffusion” explanation that some stocks reflect market-wide information faster than 
others.  
Our contribution to this literature on return co-movement is in showing that HFT has a 
significant impact on return co-movement and that this impact is consistent with both demand-
based explanations such as correlated trading demands as well as information diffusion effects 
through faster price discovery.   
There are two main interpretations of the R
2
 from a regression of a stock’s returns on 
market returns (the commonly used measure of return co-movement).  The first is that co-
movement is inversely related to the amount of stock-specific information impounded into prices 
(e.g., Roll, 1988; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003; Jin 
and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009).  Consistent with this notion, these 
studies generally find that return co-movement is higher in countries with weaker investor 
protection and less transparent information environments.  The second interpretation is that a low 
degree of return co-movement can be due to a relatively high amount of stock-specific 
information and/or a relatively high level of noise in stock prices (e.g., Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel, and Xu, 2001; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Bartram, Brown, and Stulz, 2012).   
An increase in the co-movement of returns is likely to be accompanied by an increase in 
the co-movement of liquidity and vice versa.  The first reason is that many of the causes of co-
movement in either returns or liquidity also cause co-movement in the other variable.  For 
example, correlated shocks to investor demands to trade groups of stocks impact both the returns 
and the liquidity of those stocks.  Similarly, funding constraints of liquidity providers are more 
likely to impact market-wide liquidity following a market-wide return shock and therefore 
stronger return co-movement is likely to lead to stronger co-movement in liquidity.  Second, 
liquidity is a priced characteristic and is persistent.  A market-wide decrease in liquidity is likely 
to increase future expected market returns, causing a negative contemporaneous market return.  
Stronger co-movement in liquidity will therefore lead to stronger co-movement in returns.  
 
2.3. The effects of HFT on co-movement 
HFT trading strategies can be broadly classified into (i) market making strategies and (ii) 
opportunistic strategies (comprising arbitrage, momentum, and other strategies).  Hagströmer 




They find that HFT market makers account for the majority of HFT volume and HFT orders and, 
as expected, supply liquidity more often than opportunistic HFTs.   
Importantly, there are reasons why both market making and opportunistic HFTs are likely 
to increase co-movement in returns and in liquidity.  First, opportunistic HFTs are likely to 
demand liquidity in a number of stocks at the same time.  For example, statistical arbitrage often 
involves simultaneously taking long and short positions in a number of stocks that appear 
relatively mispriced.  The different legs of the strategy must be transacted around the same time 
to avoid price movements while the strategy is only partially implemented.  Similarly, 
momentum strategies can involve placing long and short positions on different stocks at the same 
time.  Furthermore, opportunistic HFTs use similar strategies to one another, based on similar 
signals, which can further amplify the correlation in liquidity demand across stocks (e.g., 
Chaboud et al., 2014; Biais and Woolley, 2011; Boehmer et al., 2018).  Jarrow and Protter 
(2012) highlight that opportunistic HFTs can have a destabilizing effect when they unknowingly 
coordinate on a common signal.  In extreme cases, such as the “quant meltdown” of 2007 (see 
Khandani and Lo, 2011), opportunistic HFTs may all earn large profits or make large losses at 
the same time and thus increase their activity or withdraw from the market at the same time.  
Time-series variation in opportunistic HFT activity can therefore increase co-movement in 
liquidity and in returns. 
Second, market making HFTs are also likely to increase co-movement in liquidity and in 
returns through (i) increased monitoring of related securities, and (ii) correlated liquidity 
withdrawals when conditions become unfavorable.  Cespa and Foucault (2014) model market 
makers that condition their liquidity provision on the prices of other stocks and show that such 
“price watching” gives rise to cross-asset liquidity spillovers.  In their model, market makers in a 
stock X infer a noisy signal about the stock’s fundamental value by observing the prices of 
another stock, Y.  An exogenous liquidity shock to stock Y causes the prices of stock Y to give a 
noisier signal about the value of stock X.  The increased uncertainty about the fundamental value 
of stock X causes the market makers to scale back their liquidity provision in stocks X, leading 
to a liquidity spillover.   
In addition to liquidity spillovers, which increase co-movement in liquidity, price-
watching market makers cause price changes in one stock to be rapidly reflected in the prices of 




predicts that liquidity spillovers (and thus also co-movement) will be stronger in the presence of 
a larger number of price-watching market makers.  HFT market makers, compared to traditional 
market makers, are better able to automatically monitor the prices and market conditions of 
many other stocks and use this information in optimally setting quotes (Hendershott and Riordan, 
2013); in the language of Cespa and Foucault (2014) HFTs are more likely to be price watchers.  
Therefore, an increase in HFT market making is likely to increase liquidity spillovers and co-
movement in liquidity and in returns.  Lyle et al. (2016) show that the enhanced monitoring 
ability of AT/HFT is the main reason they tend to increase liquidity.  Similarly, Boehmer et al. 
(2018) argue that one of the reasons that HFT tend to face lower adverse selection risks and thus 
increase liquidity (decrease short-term volatility) is that they are better able to extract signals 
from related same-industry securities and from the market index. 
Although evidence suggests AT/HFT market makers tend to increase liquidity on average 
(e.g., Hendershott et al., 2011, Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013), their lack of affirmative obligations 
allows them to withdraw from the market and suspend liquidity provision during unfavorable 
market conditions (e.g., Anand and Venkataraman, 2016).  A concern raised by regulators and 
practitioners is that HFTs suspend liquidity provision during times when liquidity provision is 
most needed—when information asymmetry or perceived asymmetry is high, or the market is in 
a period of stress.  This endogenous liquidity provision can amplify variation in liquidity, and to 
the extent that HFTs suspend liquidity provision in a number of stocks at the same time, it is 
likely to further increase co-movement in liquidity and in returns.  An extreme example is the 
“flash crash” of May 2010.  Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2017) find that HFTs did not 
trigger the flash crash but exacerbated the initial liquidity shock by withdrawing from the market 
or switching from providing liquidity to demanding liquidity.  Similarly, the dynamic trading 
model of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2013) predicts that volatility leads HFTs to reduce their 
provision of liquidity.  Because volatility has a systematic or market-wide component, the 
variation in HFT liquidity provision will also have a market-wide component.  
Based on the discussion above, our two hypotheses are as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: HFT increases co-movement in returns 





In general, co-movement in returns and in liquidity is a concern for investors because it 
limits the usefulness of diversification and thus contributes to systematic return and liquidity 
risks.  There is, however, another reason why HFT is likely to increase co-movement in returns 
and in liquidity that does not necessarily increase systematic risk.  Biais, Foucault, and Moinas 
(2015) and Foucault, Hombert, and Roşu (2016) argue that HFTs’ ability to react more quickly 
to public information will increase the informativeness of prices, in particular the speed at which 
they reflect public information.  Consistent with this prediction, Carrion (2013), Brogaard et al. 
(2014a), and others find that HFTs increase informational efficiency and cause prices to reflect 
information faster.  Faster incorporation of market-wide information across stocks can increase 
stock price synchronicity and return co-movement.  For example, Chordia, Sarkar, and 
Subrahmanyam (2011) find that the returns of small stocks tend to follow those of large stocks.  
They attribute this finding to market-wide information being first reflected in the prices of large 
stocks, which are followed by a large number of analysts and traded by institutional investors, 
and then gradually transmitted from large to small stocks.  Because the cross-correlations occur 
with a lag, contemporaneous correlations fail to measure the full extent of return co-movement.
4
  
When the informational efficiency of prices increases, particularly when less informationally 
efficient stocks become faster in reflecting market-wide information, contemporaneous co-
movement should increase.  This mechanism by which HFT can increase co-movement can be 
distinguished from the other mechanisms by isolating the increase in co-movement that is due to 
decreased delay in impounding market-wide information.  
 
3. Data  
Our sample period is from February 1, 2007, to February 27, 2009, which covers two 
months prior the first Chi-X entry in Europe (starting with the Dutch and German markets) and 
extends to two months after Chi-X started to operate in Spain.  During this period, Chi-X 
commenced trading equities from 13 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom (UK).  We include all of these countries in our sample, except Switzerland due to data 
deficiencies.  We exclude the effects of the financial crisis (which falls during our sample period) 
                                                 
4
 The failure of contemporaneous correlations to adequately measure the extent of co-movement is why non-




from our analysis by using a difference-in-differences approach that sweeps out time-series 
variation in co-movement that occurs for reasons other than changes in HFT activity. 
We construct a sample of stocks from each of the European countries as follows.  First, 
we include all stocks that at any time within our sample period are traded on the Chi-X platform.  
Second, we include the top 75 stocks from each country based on aggregate trading volume 
during the sample period.
5
  Many (but not all) of the top 75 stocks in each country are at some 
stage traded on Chi-X, in which case we do not duplicate them in the sample.  Our results are 
robust to using the top 20% of stocks per country rather than the top 75 stocks (Online Appendix 
Section 2).  The main difference between these two sampling approaches is that using the top 75 
stocks results in approximately equal weights on each of the 12 countries in the sample, whereas 
using the top 20% of stocks places greater weight on markets that have more listed stocks 
because they end up having more stocks in the aggregate sample.  Following Hendershott et al. 
(2011), stocks with a price above EUR 1,000 are omitted.  Our final sample comprises 1,311 
stocks and 674,307 stock-day observations. 
Figure 1 shows the sequence in which Chi-X commenced trading European stocks and 
the total number of stocks traded on the platform, grouped into terciles by volume.  There are 
zero stocks traded on Chi-X at start of the sample and the first step change occurs with the entry 
of Chi-X in Germany and the Netherlands.  The addition of other countries’ stocks follows a step 
function with the changes distributed fairly evenly through time, which is favorable for our 
quasi-experimental econometric design.  By the end of our sample, Chi-X is trading close to 400 
of the top tercile stocks (T3), and close to 200 stocks from each of the middle and lowest terciles 
(T2 and T1).  Consequently, our sample of stocks also contains a considerable number of stocks 
that are not traded on Chi-X even by the end of the sample period.  Such stocks contribute to the 
analysis as controls for any confounding time-series trends.     
 
< Figure 1 here > 
 
We obtain intraday data on trades and quotes, aggregated at an hourly frequency, from 
the Thomson Reuters Tick History data set, maintained by SIRCA.  The data include the best bid 
and ask quotes at the end of the hourly interval, as well as the number of trades, the traded 
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 The reason for including this second group of stocks is so that the sample also contains some stocks that do not end 




volume, the volume-weighted average price and the number of electronic messages during the 
hourly interval.
6
  For each stock, we obtain trade and quote data for (i) the home market (its 
primary listing), (ii) Chi-X (if the stock is traded on Chi-X), and (iii) all other exchanges and 
multilateral trading facilities that trade the stock (see the Appendix for the list of 
exchanges/MTFs for which we consolidate data).  For each stock we merge the data from all of 
the venues in which it is traded to construct consolidated order books and consolidated records of 
trading activity.  After calculating liquidity proxies (described below) we aggregate the hourly 
data to stock-day observations for the instrumental variables panel regressions.  For metrics that 
require comparisons of value (e.g., dollar volume) across countries, we convert values into EUR. 
We exclude weekends and national holidays in each country.  In constructing daily 
aggregates, we use trading activity between 8:00am and 4:30pm Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
7
  
Quotes or trades that are more than 20% away from the price on the home exchange are 
excluded.  We winsorize all variables at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles within each country.  
 
4. Measures and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides definitions of the measures of HFT activity, liquidity, fragmentation, 
and control variables, along with descriptive statistics.  Below we elaborate on how we compute 
the most important of these measures. 
 
< Table 1 here > 
4.1. HFT measures 
We use proxies for HFT activity based on electronic message traffic, similar to 
Hendershott et al. (2011) and Boehmer et al. (2015).
8
  The first proxy, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡, is 
negative trading volume (in EUR 100) divided by the number of quote messages:  
                                                 
6
 The number of electronic messages is defined as the sum of best bid and best ask updates during the interval, 
where an update is a change to the price or quantity at either the best bid or offer.  This captures all order 
submissions, amendments and cancellations, at or within the best prevailing quotes.  
7
 To avoid consolidating across exchanges with very different trading hours we exclude exchanges in time zones that 
that are more than three hours ahead of or behind GMT. 
8
 Hendershott et al. (2011) and Boehmer et al. (2015) use these measures as proxies for algorithmic trading (AT), 
which includes HFT but is somewhat broader.  Given HFT is a subset of AT, an increase in HFT activity will be 
reflected in higher values on these measures of AT.  Our main analysis focuses on the changes in these measures as 
a result of the introduction of Chi-X.  Because Chi-X specifically distinguished itself on the basis that it was a low 
latency trading platform, it primarily stimulated HFT activity (Chordia et al., 2013; Menkveld, 2013, 2016; 




𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  −
𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
100𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
  ,    (1) 
where 𝑖 is a stock, 𝑡 is a trading day, 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is consolidated trading volume, 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the 
number of electronic messages. The second proxy for HFT is the number of messages divided by 
the number of trades in each day: 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
 ,    (2) 
where 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the number of trades for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡. The intuition behind both of these 
measures is that the main indicator of HFT activity is increased message traffic, because 
computers are able to place orders at a very high speed and algorithms constantly search and 
exploit small trading opportunities; therefore, they submit large amounts of messages each day.  
Messages include order submissions, modifications, and cancelations.  Both HFT proxies 
normalize message traffic by volume or trade counts.  We calculate both HFT proxies separately 
for the stock’s home exchange, Chi-X, and the consolidated market.  We find similar results 
across these three versions and therefore use the consolidated version in this paper.  
Figs. 2 and 3 plot the time-series of message traffic and HFT activity (𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡), 
respectively, for terciles of our sample stocks.  In all terciles, message traffic increases through 
time.  The increase is not due to changes in overall volume because message traffic normalized 
by volume (𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡) also increases through time.  Part of the increase in message traffic 
and HFT activity (if not most) is attributable to the entry of Chi-X in a staggered fashion 
throughout our sample period (we confirm this in regressions below).  Stocks in the highest 
volume tercile (T3) experience the largest growth in message traffic and in HFT activity.  This 
result is consistent with the fact that proportionally more of the T3 stocks end up traded on Chi-
X (Figure 1).   
 
< Figure 2 here > 
< Figure 3 here > 
 
Table 1 shows that there is a higher proportion of HFT activity on Chi-X compared to the 
home exchange.  For example, the ratio of electronic messages to trades (𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) has an 
                                                                                                                                                             
the AT measures around the entry of Chi-X is likely to be driven by variation in HFT and thus in our analysis we 




average of 17.26 in the home market and a staggering 192.34 in Chi-X.  The descriptive statistics 
on the HFT measures have many similarities with what Hendershott et al. (2011) report for the 
US markets.  For example, there is more message traffic in higher volume (larger) stocks 
(attributable to their higher overall trading activity), the HFT proxies have lower averages for 
larger stocks (primarily due to the pre-Chi-X periods) and converge to a similar level for all 
stock size categories after the entry of Chi-X.   
 
4.2. Liquidity measures 
Following Karolyi et al. (2012), who analyze the causes of co-movement in liquidity, in 
our baseline analysis we use Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity, inverted so that it becomes 
a measure of liquidity, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡.  Amihud’s measure is based on the price impact of trading volume 
and is strongly positively related to other liquidity estimates like the bid-ask spread, depth, and 




We calculate our main liquidity measure each stock-day as follows: 





)𝐻ℎ=1 )  ,    (3) 
where |𝑟𝑖,𝑡,ℎ| is the absolute midquote return in basis points (bps) for stock 𝑖 in hour ℎ of day 𝑡, 
and 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡,ℎ is hourly consolidated volume (in EUR ‘000).  The log makes the distribution of 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 closer to a Normal distribution and the multiplication by –1 reverses the interpretation 
from illiquidity to liquidity. 
In robustness tests we find similar results using the relative quoted bid-ask spread in bps 
as an alternative measure of liquidity:  






)𝐻ℎ=1   ,    (4) 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,ℎ and 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,ℎ are the ask and bid quotes at the end of hour ℎ for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡. 
 Table 1 shows that both liquidity measures monotonically increase across the volume 
terciles (higher volume stocks are more liquid).  Chi-X has a narrower average spread than the 
home market, despite the fact that volume on Chi-X is less than that of the home market.  The 
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 Goyenko et al. (2009) compare high-frequency liquidity measures with monthly and annual measures and find that 
in the post-decimalization period (after 2001) the correlation between effective spread and Amihud’s measure 
increases, in contrast to other liquidity measures.  Amihud’s measure is also used in the literature on how liquidity 




narrower spreads on Chi-X are consistent with Menkveld’s (2013) finding that Chi-X encourages 
highly competitive HFT market makers to provide liquidity.  
 
4.3. Market fragmentation measures  
 An increase in the number of venues in which a stock is traded makes liquidity more 
dispersed and can affect the overall level of liquidity (Bennett and Wei, 2006).  To control for 
such effects we estimate four market fragmentation proxies. 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺1𝑖,𝑡 is the number of trading 
venues that have executed trades in stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡.  The larger the number of venues, the more 
fragmented is trading.  Table 1 shows that across the full sample, stocks on average trade in 3.57 
venues, with a tendency for higher volume (larger) stocks to trade in more venues than lower 
volume stocks.   
Our second fragmentation measure, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝑡, is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
which is used by Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015) in analyzing fragmentation in 
European equity markets: 





𝑗  ,     (5) 
where 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is volume of stock 𝑖 on market 𝑗 on day 𝑡.  𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺3𝑖,𝑡 is similar to the second 
measure, except it is calculated using the number of trades instead of trading volume. The last 
fragmentation proxy, 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺4𝑖,𝑡, is the volume market share of all venues other than home 
exchange (range: zero to one).  We use 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝑡 in our baseline tests.  Our results are robust to 
using the other measures. 
 
4.4. Co-movement measures 
A long line of literature analyzes co-movement or “commonality” in returns and 
liquidity.  Following Morck et al. (2000), Hameed et al. (2010), and Karolyi et al. (2012), we 
measure co-movement in returns (liquidity) using the R
2
 from regressions of individual stock 
returns (liquidity) on market returns (market liquidity).  High R
2
 indicates a high degree of co-
movement—much of the variation in the individual stock returns or liquidity is explained by 
market-wide variation.  For each stock in each month we estimate the following regressions 
using daily observations: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖








where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is the daily midquote return for stock 𝑖, 𝑟𝑚,𝑡+𝑗 is the market return in the country of 
stock 𝑖 calculated as the equally weighted average of returns for all stocks in the country 
(excluding stock 𝑖).10  The lead and lag terms in the regression account for non-synchronous 
trading in the spirit of Dimson (1979).  Logit transformation of the regression R
2
 to make it into 
an unbounded variable (as per Morck et al., 2000; Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012) 






)  .       (7) 
 We estimate co-movement in liquidity in a similar way, but include an additional step (a 
regression estimated for each stock using the full sample) that removes persistence in liquidity 
and day-of-the-week seasonality (similar to Karolyi et al. (2012)): 




  ,    (8) 
where 𝐷𝑗  is a set of dummy variables for each of the working days of the week.  The residuals, 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝐼𝑄
, are purged of first order serial correlation and day-of-the-week effects and are therefore 
used to estimate co-movement in liquidity in a similar manner to the procedure for returns:  
?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝐼𝑄 = 𝛼𝑖










)   .       (10) 
Similar to the procedure for returns, ω̂𝑚,𝑡+𝑗
𝐿𝐼𝑄
 is the equal-weighted average of all individual 
stocks’ liquidity residuals (excluding stock 𝑖) in each country.  Our results are robust to using 
volume-weighting and using the bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of liquidity.  For a 
valid estimate of co-movement in returns or liquidity, we require a minimum of 15 valid daily 
observations in regressions (6) and (9). 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on co-movement in returns, liquidity, and in HFT 
volume, for stock terciles as well as separately for each country in the sample.  To simplify 
interpretation of the magnitudes, Table 2 reports the co-movement measures before the logit 
transformation, i.e., the regression R
2
s.  Higher volume stocks (T3) tend to have stronger co-
movement with their respective markets in terms of returns, liquidity, and HFT volume.  The 
countries with the highest average co-movement in returns are Sweden (R
2
 of 51%), France, 
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 We exclude stock 𝑖 to avoid spurious relationship in case the stock is a large proportion in the index and 




Germany, and the UK, whereas the lowest co-movement occurs in Belgium (R
2
 of 24%), 
Austria, Finland, and Denmark.  Co-movement in liquidity follows a similar pattern across 
countries, i.e., co-movement in returns is positively correlated with co-movement in liquidity.  
Interestingly, co-movement in HFT volume across stocks also shows similar patterns to co-
movement in liquidity for different countries and across stock terciles.  Thus, it appears there is 
commonality in the co-movement measures, suggesting common causes drive co-movement in 
returns, liquidity, and HFT volumes.   
 
< Table 2 here > 
 
5. Analysis of HFT’s impact on co-movement 
We exploit the staggered entry of Chi-X in the European markets as an instrument for the 
level of HFT activity.  Chi-X distinguished itself from the traditional national stock exchanges 
by having a considerably faster trading platform.
11
  It was therefore conducive to HFT and 
rapidly captured market share from the national stock exchanges.  Having an instrument that 
affects different markets at different points in time has the advantage of allowing us to control 
for confounding factors using time fixed effects.  The international sample, spanning several 
markets, reduces the chance that our findings are specific to a particular market. 
For the Chi-X entry to be a valid instrument it has to be exogenous, relevant, and not 
affect co-movement directly, only through its impact on HFT.  First, we confirm its relevance 
using F-tests in the first-stage regressions, strongly rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
instrument is not a determinant of HFT activity.  Second, there is little doubt that the entry of 
Chi-X is exogenous with respect to co-movement.  Chi-X was a response to the European 
Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which enabled competition 
between trading venues.
12
  Third, while there are several reasons why the entry of Chi-X would 
impact co-movement through its effects on HFT, it is unlikely that the Chi-X entry has a direct 
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 For example, a Chi-X press release on April 7, 2008, claims that Chi-X is “up to 10 times faster than the fastest 
European primary exchange”. 
12
 Chi-X commenced trading stocks from different countries sequentially and within each country starting with the 
largest stocks and progressively adding smaller stocks.  In many countries, Chi-X added the constituents of the 
market’s large capitalization index first and only after confirming that there are no technical problems with trading 
those stocks did it expand its coverage to constituents of a broader market index.  The sequence in which stocks are 





effect on co-movement independent of its effect on HFT.  Chi-X impacts other market 
characteristics such as volume and fragmentation for reasons that could be associated with, or 
independent of, HFT.  We therefore control for market characteristics in the instrumental 
variables regressions, including volume, volatility, fragmentation, and price level.  This ensures 
we are not picking up, for example, the effects of fragmentation on co-movement. 
Other studies of AT/HFT also use a variety of market structure changes to help establish 
causality.  Most of these studies use changes within a single market or a single event, for 
example, the introduction of automated quote dissemination at the NYSE (Hendershott et al., 
2011), the entry of Chi-X in Dutch equities (Menkveld, 2013; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016), 
the introduction of co-location at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm (Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordèn, and 
Riordan, 2015), technology upgrades at the London Stock Exchange (Brogaard et al., 2014b), 
and short selling bans (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2017).  Boehmer et al. (2015) use an 
international sample, exploiting the introduction of co-location in a number of markets.   
Does the choice of market or exogenous shock matter in analyzing HFT?  Several factors 
suggest HFT have a fairly consistent impact across different developed markets, making it likely 
that results from one market or markets generalize to others, and making the choice of sample in 
most cases a non-critical factor.  First, the existing literature examines a variety of developed 
markets and different exogenous shocks and, across these varied settings, finds fairly cohesive 
results about how HFT affects markets (e.g., HFT tend to increase liquidity and lead to faster 
price discovery).  To the extent that we also measure some market characteristics that have been 
previously studied, our results are consistent with findings from other markets.  For example, 
consistent with the literature, we find that a shock that reduces latency in trading (the 
introduction of Chi-X) substantially increases the level of HFT activity and that the increase in 
HFT is associated with an increase in liquidity.  Second, in an international comparison of the 
effects of AT/HFT on European, US, and Asian markets, Boehmer et al. (2015) find that 
AT/HFT have remarkably consistent effects across markets.  One of the factors that contributes 
to the consistency across markets is that the major HFT firms are global and implement similar 
or identical trading strategies/algorithms in a number of different markets.  This is also true in 
our sample—the major HFTs that commence trading following the entry of Chi-X include the 
major global firms that also trade the US and Asian markets (e.g., Menkveld, 2013).  Third, 




design features (e.g., they tend to be electronic, centralized, automated limit order book markets, 
with anonymity, similar trading platforms, fragmentation of trading, and so on).  There are of 
course also differences across markets, but the differences tend to be secondary design features 
or matters of degree (e.g., extent of fragmentation).  Consequently, when global HFT firms trade 
across similar market structures in different countries, it is reasonable to expect similar effects.   
Although the major effects of HFT in most markets are likely to be similar, some 
variation across markets will prevail.  We ensure that our results are not overly driven by a 
particular market by drawing on a broad sample of countries.  Any effects that are specific to a 
particular country have a relatively small influence on our overall results, which reflect the 
average or common effects in multiple markets. 
We start by estimating the effects of Chi-X on HFT activity and other market 
characteristics using an ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression on stock-day observations: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 + 𝑖,𝑡  ,    (11) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is one of the two HFT proxies, message traffic, volume, inverse midquote price, 
volatility, or fragmentation.  𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 is a dummy variable equal to one when a stock is traded on 
Chi-X at that point in time and zero otherwise, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects. We 
estimate (11) on the whole panel and also separately for each stock tercile by volume.   
 Table 3 reports the estimated effects of Chi-X.  The entry of Chi-X is associated with 
large increases in HFT activity.  The increases are statistically significant for both HFT proxies 
and message traffic in the pooled sample as well as individual volume terciles (with the 
exception of one of the HFT proxies, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡, in one of the terciles, T2).  In the pooled 
sample, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 increases by approximately 17.32 (implying EUR 1,732 less traded 
volume per message), which is a large amount given the pooled sample mean of 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
is –27.46 (implying an average of EUR 2,746 traded volume per message).  The entry of Chi-X 
is also associated with a decrease in volume (𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
 ) in the two highest volume terciles, an 
increase in volatility, and an increase in fragmentation (as expected). 
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
Next we turn to the impact of HFT on co-movement in returns and in liquidity.  For this 




Hendershot et al. (2011).  Because different stocks commence trading on Chi-X at different 
times, we are able to include stock and time fixed effects in the panel regressions, which 
effectively gives a difference-in-differences estimator.  This eliminates any differences in co-
movement through time that are unrelated to the level of HFT, as well as time-invariant cross-
sectional variation in co-movement. 
The first-stage regressions are estimated on a panel of stock-day observations: 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 +  ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  .  (12) 
We average the fitted values of HFT activity from the first stage for each stock 𝑖 in each month 𝜏 
(𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ ) to match the frequency of the co-movement estimates and then use them in the second-




= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  ,    (13) 
where 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is one of the proxies for HFT activity, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects, 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 is a dummy variable equal to one when a stock is traded on Chi-X at that point in time 
and zero otherwise, and 𝑅𝑖,𝜏




).  The set 
of control variables in both stages comprise measures of fragmentation (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝑡), volume 
(𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
 ), volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡), and the inverse of the midquote price (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ).   
 Table 4 reports the results from the second-stage regressions.  The results show that HFT 
increases co-movement in both returns and in liquidity.  In the pooled sample, the impact of HFT 
on co-movement is statistically significant at the 1% level and is stronger than the impact of any 
of the control variables (fragmentation, volume, volatility, inverse price).  In terms of magnitude, 
the coefficient 7.197 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in  𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝜏 increases 
the average return co-movement R
2
 by 7.13 percentage points, all else equal.
13
  The estimated 
increase of 7.13 percentage points is meaningful given that the average R
2
 of the return co-
movement regressions varies between 24% and 51% across countries.  The increase is around 
one-fifth of the pooled sample average return R
2
 (41%, Table 2) or around two-fifths of a 
standard deviation.   
The magnitude of the impact of HFT on co-movement in liquidity is even larger.  The 
coefficient 13.481 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in HFT increases the average 
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 Since the co-movement estimates are logit transformed R
2 
values, to provide a meaningful interpretation we 






 by 9.52 percentage points.  This increase is around two-fifths of the 
pooled sample average (23%, Table 2) or around two-thirds of a standard deviation.  The results 
support our hypotheses that HFT increases co-movement. 
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
The impact of HFT is not uniform across terciles.  HFT has a significant positive impact 
on return and liquidity co-movement in the lower two volume terciles and the lower two liquidity 
terciles, but not the highest tercile (the largest, most liquid, highest volume stocks).  The impact 
of HFT is the strongest in the middle volume tercile, where a standard deviation increase in HFT 
is associated with an increase of in return co-movement of around 30 percentage points.  The 
impact of HFT on co-movement in liquidity is positive and significant across all volatility 
terciles, and the impact on co-movement in returns is significant for the two lowest volatility 
terciles.  
One explanation for HFT’s stronger impact on co-movement in smaller stocks is from 
increased monitoring by HFT market makers as the mechanism by which HFT increase co-
movement.  Lyle et al. (2016) show that market makers with limited monitoring capacity (e.g., 
non-HFT market makers) allocate more effort to monitoring information relevant for the pricing 
of large stocks in which they face the largest potential losses from having stale quotes picked off.  
Thus, when monitoring capacity increases due to HFT market makers, there is more scope for 
improvements in the speed with which quotes in small stocks reflect market-wide information 
and market-wide liquidity than there is for large stocks.  Consistent with this explanation, 
Chordia et al. (2011) show that information tends to be first incorporated in the prices of large 
stocks before being transmitted to small stocks.  This tendency implies that small stocks have 
larger potential increases in the speed with which they reflect information and thus their co-
movement with the market.  In support of this notion, Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016) show 
that by making it easier to trade on systematic information, the introduction of exchange traded 
funds (ETFs) increases the speed with which market-wide information is reflect in the prices of 
small stocks (but not big stocks) thereby increasing their co-movement with the market.  It seems 




Non-uniformity across terciles in the impact of HFT is also consistent with a habitat 
effect; an increase in the liquidity of medium and small stocks due to HFT increases the 
likelihood that they will be held by large institutions and subsequently co-move with other stocks 
held by institutions.  It is also consistent with faster diffusion of market-wide information.  
 The estimated impacts of HFT on co-movement are qualitatively similar (and therefore 
not reported) using spreads as the liquidity measure, estimating the models in first differences 
instead of levels, and permutations of the control variables. 
 We also examine the effects of HFT on other stock characteristics (returns, liquidity, 
spreads, and volatility) using the same 2SLS IV approach.  Table 5 reports the results.  HFT 
increases liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏, the price impact based measure) and decreases bid-ask spreads.  Both 
of these effects are highly statistically significant, of a meaningful magnitude, and consistent 
with several other studies that show HFT improves liquidity (e.g., Menkveld, 2013; Hasbrouck 
and Saar, 2013; Brogaard et al., 2015).  For example, the coefficients in Table 5 imply that the 
increase in HFT activity due to Chi-X results in a decrease in bid-ask spreads of around 61 bps, 
which is close to a 50% decrease from the pre-Chi-X level of spreads.  Consistent with this 
estimate, Menkveld (2013) shows that spreads in the Dutch market decrease by around 50% after 
a HFT market maker starts quoting following the entry of Chi-X.  HFT has no significant effect 
on returns.  HFT has a positive effect on volatility (although only marginally statistically 
significant), which is consistent with the findings of Boehmer et al. (2015) in an international 
sample.  Although Boehmer et al. (2015) focus on the broader category of AT, their empirical 
design has similarities with ours insomuch as they use speed upgrades (colocation in their case) 
as instrumental variables. 
 
6. Analysis of the channels by which HFT impacts co-movement  
The increase in co-movement due to HFT is consistent with a number of possible 
mechanisms.  To get some insight into the relative importance of the different mechanisms, we 
estimate multiple mediation models and compare the magnitude and significance of various 
channels (following Preacher and Hayes, 2004, 2008). 
One channel through which HFT could increase co-movement in returns is through 
correlated trading across stocks (e.g., Chaboud et al., 2014; Bias and Wooley, 2011; Boehmer et 




(2012) point out that opportunistic HFTs can increase systematic return variation and have a 
destabilizing effect when they unknowingly coordinate on a common signal.   
A second channel is by increasing the speed with which prices reflect public market-wide 
information (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014a; Carrion, 2013).  Barberis et al. (2005), in what they 
refer to as the “information diffusion view”, argue that market-wide information is reflected in 
the prices of different stocks at different rates.  An increase in the synchronicity with which 
individual stocks reflect market-wide information therefore increases co-movement.  Such an 
increase in synchronicity could arise if, for example, HFT increase the speed with which market-
wide information is transmitted from large stocks to small stocks, which is consistent with our 
finding that smaller stocks tend to have the largest increase in co-movement.  Disentangling the 
information diffusion channel from the correlated HFT trading channel is important because 
increased co-movement from faster information diffusion is beneficial in that it reduces pricing 
errors, whereas increased co-movement for other reasons can increase systematic risk.   
We account for a third channel, which is that the increase in liquidity due to HFT activity 
(recall spreads fall by close to 50% as a result of HFT activity following the entry of Chi-X) 
makes medium and small stocks more attractive to other non-HFT participants, in particular 
large institutional investors that are limited to investing in highly liquid stocks.  Prior studies find 
that a stock’s co-movement with the market increases when it is added to a market index and at 
least part of this increase is due to the increase in holdings by large investors (e.g., Barberis et 
al., 2005).  In what they refer to as the “habitat view”, Barberis et al. (2005) argue that investors 
hold subsets of stocks (due to transaction costs, information constraints, and so on).  When the 
risk aversion, sentiment, or liquidity needs of investors change, they tend to trade their holdings 
in a similar manner, creating a common factor in the given subsets of stocks.  An increase in 
stock liquidity makes it more likely that the stock becomes part of the “habitat” of large investors 
and therefore that the stock will co-move with other stocks held by large institutions. 
The distinguishing features of these three channels are that the information diffusion 
channel implies the causal chain ↑HFT => ↓delay in prices => ↑return co-movement, whereas 
the habitat view implies the causal chain ↑HFT => ↑liquidity => ↑return co-movement, and the 
correlated trading channel implies a direct effect (↑HFT => ↑return co-movement) that does not 
occur through ↓delay in prices or through ↑liquidity.  Mediation analysis can quantify the role of 




information (“delay in prices”) using the method developed by Hou and Moskowitz (2005).  The 
approach involves estimating two regressions of individual stock returns on market returns: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
 + 𝛽𝑖
 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡
                   (14) 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖
 + 𝛴𝑗=0
4 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
 𝑟𝑚,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑖,𝑡
𝑟      (15) 
and saving the two R
2






  Whenever 
market-wide information is not instantly and fully reflected in the returns of individual stocks, 
the R
2
 from the first regression (which includes only the contemporaneous market return) will be 
less than the R
2
 of the second regression (which includes contemporaneous and lagged market 
returns).  The difference between the R
2
 values is the extent to which market-wide information is 
impounded in prices with a delay.  The delay metric is therefore: 




2,𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑇𝐸𝐷  .        (16) 
We use the serial multiple mediator model of Hayes (2012) and Preacher and Hayes 
(2004, 2008).  The general idea behind these mediation models is estimating a series of 
regressions involving various permutations of the independent, mediator, and dependent 
variables and combining the outcomes to infer the direct and mediated channels by which the 
independent variable affects the dependent variable.  The procedure ensures all the channels sum 
to the total effect of the independent variable on he dependent variable.  Hayes (2012) and 
Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) provide the relevant statistics for testing the significance of the 
various channels and for expressing the strength of a mediated channel as a proportion of the 
total effect.  The intuition for how a mediation channel is identified from a series of regressions 
(in the simple case of a single mediator) is that if a mediating relation exists the following three 
results will hold: (i) the independent variable affects the mediator in a regression of the mediator 
on the independent variable; (ii) the independent variable affects the dependent variable in a 
regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable; and (iii) the mediator and not 
the independent variable affects the dependent variable in a regression of the dependent variable 
on both the independent and mediator variables.  
Figure 4 illustrates the results of the multiple mediation models for the drivers of return 
co-movement.  The coefficient estimates support the existence of all three channels.  However, 
the channels differ in importance.  Approximately one-third (35.1%) of the impact of HFT on 
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return co-movement occurs through faster diffusion of market-wide information, consistent with 
the evidence that HFT facilitate price discovery (e.g., Brogaard et al., 2014a).  That leaves 
around two-thirds of the increase in return co-movement to other channels, which potentially 
increases systematic risk.  Only 9.0% of the total effect occurs through the effect of HFT on 
liquidity.  Thus, there is some support for the habitat view as a channel by which HFT increase 
co-movement in returns, but this channel is not strong relative to the other mechanisms.  That 
leaves 55.9% of the effect of HFT on return co-movement as a direct effect.  Given our 
discussion of the ways that HFT might impact co-movement, most of this direct effect is likely 
due to correlated trading strategies of HFT.  This finding is consistent with Hasbrouck and Seppi 
(2001) who show that co-movement in returns is largely driven by co-movement in order flows.  
 
< Figure 4 here > 
 
Turning to HFT’s impact on co-movement in liquidity, one channel is the “habitat” effect 
described earlier.  The increase in liquidity resulting from HFT market making can attract a 
clientele of large institutional investors.  When such investors trade into or out of positions in a 
correlated manner (e.g., due to fund flows) they can create an additional source of liquidity co-
movement.  Its distinguishing feature is the mediating role played by the level of liquidity: ↑HFT 
=> ↑liquidity => ↑liquidity co-movement.  
A second channel is associated with HFT’s effect on volatility (which we find to be 
positive and significant in Table 5).  Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) report that market-wide 
volatility creates similar trading behavior among traders and hence affects liquidity co-
movement.  Similarly Karolyi et al. (2012) find higher liquidity co-movement when volatility is 
higher.  More specific to HFT, although HFT market makers increase liquidity on average, their 
lack of a binding commitment such as an affirmative obligation in providing liquidity means the 
liquidity they provide can be a source of fragility and subject to sharp withdrawals when 
conditions become unfavorable.  Anand and Venkataraman (2016) show that “endogenous 
liquidity providers” (many of which are HFTs) scale back in unison when conditions are 
unfavorable.  Such behavior creates additional volatility, and can increase liquidity co-




flash crashes (Kirilenko et al., 2017).  This channel is identified through the proportion of the 
increase in liquidity co-movement that is associated with increased volatility.   
Finally, there are reasons why HFT can increase liquidity co-movement directly rather 
than through mediating variables.  One such reason is HFT’s enhanced ability to monitor 
conditions in a broader cross-section of stocks and adjust their liquidity provision accordingly.  
Cespa and Foucault (2014) model this mechanism and show that it gives rise to cross-asset 
liquidity spillovers that can increase liquidity co-movement.  Similarly, correlated trading of 
opportunistic HFTs can increase liquidity co-movement when they demand liquidity in aa 
number of stocks simultaneously (e.g., statistical arbitrage strategies). 
We again use multiple mediation models to tease apart the mediated channels from the 
direct channels.  Figure 5 illustrates the results.  We find support for both of the indirect 
(mediated) channels as well as the direct channel—all three channels are statistically significant.  
Similar to the results for return co-movement, the habitat effect is small in magnitude, 
accounting for only 5.1% of the total effect of HFT on liquidity co-movement.  The volatility 
channel is larger, accounting for around one-fifth of the total effect (18.8%).  The remaining 
three-quarters of the effect of HFT on liquidity co-movement is direct (76%).  Therefore, the 
results suggest HFT market makers’ enhanced ability to monitor prices and conditions in a broad 
cross-section of stocks as well as correlated trading by opportunistic HFTs are likely to be the 
main drivers of HFTs’ impact on liquidity commonality.  This conclusion is consistent with 
Koch et al. (2016) who find that co-movement in liquidity is driven by traders with similar 
trading behavior and inventories and Bai and Qin (2010) who find that systematic liquidity risk 
arises from correlated trading behavior of investors. 
 
< Figure 5 here > 
 
 It is useful to compare our results with those of Boehmer et al. (2018).  Boehmer et al. 
(2018) identify three major groups of strategies used by HFT firms—market making, cross-
market arbitrage, and directional strategies.  They show that competition among HFT firms, in 
particular among market making HFTs, tends to decrease one-second trade price volatility, 
which can be interpreted as an increase in liquidity.  This overall result is consistent with our 




impact of HFT on co-movement in returns and in liquidity, some of the mechanisms that they 
suggest as drivers of the improved liquidity imply that HFTs increase co-movement and we find 
support for these mechanisms.  For example, Boehmer et al. (2018) argue that the decrease in 
adverse selection associated with strong competition among HFTs could be because HFTs are 
better able to extract signals from related securities and from the market index.  This conjecture 
is supported by our finding that HFTs reduce the delay with which market-wide information is 
reflected in stock prices, leading to an increase in return co-movement.  Furthermore, Boehmer 
et al. (2018) argue that the reductions in temporary price impacts and realized spreads associated 
with strong competition among market making HFTs could be due to decreasing rents from 
market making.  Such competition limits the ability for market makers to cross-subsidize 
liquidity provision in adverse conditions with rents from liquidity provision in favorable 
conditions.  Consequently HFT market makers enter and exit in a correlated manner depending 
on market conditions (e.g., Anand and Venkataraman, 2016), resulting in increased co-
movement in liquidity.  Our results also support this mechanism.  
Therefore, the tendency for HFT to increase both the level of liquidity and the extent of 
co-movement in returns and in liquidity is related—both effects share several common 
mechanisms / drivers.  This finding reiterates the importance of considering the impact of HFT 
on co-movement when assessing the overall effects of HFT because the increase in co-movement 
due to HFT, at least in part, is jointly determined with the increased liquidity due to HFT.  
Considering the effects of HFT on only the level of liquidity can overstate the benefits of HFT.  
 We examine the sensitivity of the mediation results to changes in the model specification.  
We test the effects of removing the control variables, using a different set of control variables, 
and removing the liquidity channel (which is the weakest of the channels), thereby changing the 
model structure.  We find that the results are qualitatively similar across the different model 
specifications.  There are some changes to the relative importance of the different channels when 
omitting or changing the set of control variables and these changes could be due to an omitted 
variables bias in the alternative model specifications.
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7. The effects of HFT in different market conditions  
Our sample period spans a period of relatively calm, “normal” market conditions and a 
crisis period (the years 2008–2009) in which the market fell sharply and volatility was relatively 
high.  In our main analysis, we remove the effects of the crisis on the level of co-movement by 
using difference-in-differences models.  However, the effects of HFT on co-movement and other 
market characteristics could depend on market conditions.  For example, the increased volatility 
during the crisis years might cause HFTs to provide less liquidity, or to more often withdraw 
their liquidity in response to adverse conditions, or to more often take liquidity to exploit 
arbitrage opportunities. 
To explore these possibilities, we re-estimate our models allowing the effects of HFT in 
the crisis period to be different to those in the pre-crisis period.  The full set of results is in the 
Online Appendix Section 3; here we summarize the findings. 
First, we find that the sign and magnitude of the effect of HFT on return/liquidity co-
movement is similar in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  In fact, the difference in HFT’s effects 
in the two periods is not statistically distinguishable from zero, and is small in magnitude (less 
than 10% difference).  Thus, the overall tendency for HFT to increase co-movement in returns 
and in liquidity holds in normal and in high volatility conditions.  This finding is not completely 
surprising given the main channels by which HFT increase co-movement include faster price 
discovery, correlated trading strategies, and better ability to monitor other stocks—these effects 
are present in both normal and stressed/volatile market conditions.  
In contrast, we find that the effects of HFT on liquidity, and the channels by which HFT 
affects co-movement in liquidity, do depend on market conditions.  HFT are more beneficial to 
liquidity during the pre-crisis period than during the crisis, although their crisis-period effect on 
liquidity remains positive.  Other studies find that aggregate liquidity decreases during market 
declines because capital constraints in the market making sector become binding (e.g., 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed et al., 2010; Comerton-Forde et al., 2010).  Because 
many HFTs engage in market making (e.g., Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013), our finding is 
consistent with the notion that HFTs also face capital constraints that become more binding 
during periods of declining prices and high volatility. 
Furthermore, we find that a larger proportion of the effect of HFT on liquidity co-




recent findings that HFT withdraw their liquidity from a number of stocks in unison when 
conditions become unfavorable (e.g., Anand and Venkataraman, 2016), and the fact that 
unfavorable conditions such as high volatility occur more often during crises.  High volatility is 
disliked by market makers because it increases the risk of holding inventory positions.  The 
effects of HFT on liquidity co-movement are also consistent with earlier studies of the 
determinants of variation in liquidity.  For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show 
that market maker capital constraints drive liquidity co-movement and Hameed et al. (2010) 
show that the co-movement in liquidity that is induced by capital constraints becomes stronger 
during market declines.  In this regard, HFTs exhibit similar attributes as other market makers. 
Taken together, our findings comparing the pre-crisis and crisis period effects of HFT 
provide support to the concerns expressed by some market participants and regulators that HFTs 
provide less liquidity during times of market stress, which is precisely when the market needs the 
liquidity the most.  Further, our findings suggest that this tendency of HFTs affects not only the 
amount of liquidity they provide, but also contributes to commonality in liquidity, which is a 
type of liquidity risk.  Such risk is likely to affect asset prices ex-ante as investors demand higher 
rates of return as compensation for such risk (e.g., Acharya and Pedersen, 2005).  Our finding 
that the effects of HFT are somewhat different during crisis and non-crisis periods supports the 
idea of incorporating asymmetric dependence into asset pricing models, allowing the relations 
between individual stock liquidity, market-wide liquidity, and returns to vary with market 
conditions (e.g., Anthonisz and Putniņš, 2017). 
 
8. Conclusion 
Our main finding is that HFT increases co-movement in both returns and in liquidity.  We 
establish causality by exploiting the staggered entry of Chi-X in 12 European equity markets.  
The positive effect of HFT on co-movement is economically meaningful.  A one-standard-
deviation increase in HFT increases return co-movement by one-fifth of its mean and liquidity 
co-movement by two-fifths of its mean. 
The impact of HFT is not uniform across stocks; medium and small stocks (by volume 
and liquidity) experience larger increases in co-movement.  The stronger impact on medium and 
small stocks is consistent with the notion that prior to HFT, liquidity providers with limited 




stocks, where the stakes are lower.  The increase in monitoring capacity brought about by HFT 
therefore disproportionately increases monitoring of value-relevant information about medium 
and small stocks, thereby increasing their synchronicity with the rest of the market.  The non-
uniformity in the impact of HFT on co-movement is also consistent with a habitat effect; an 
increase in the liquidity of medium and small stocks due to HFT increases the likelihood that 
they will be held by large institutions and subsequently co-move with other stocks held by 
institutions. 
We also examine the effects of HFT on other stock characteristics.  Consistent with other 
studies, we find that HFT increases liquidity measured by Amihud’s price impact metric and bid-
ask spreads.  The increases in liquidity are economically meaningful; for example, spreads 
decrease by almost one-half.  HFT is more beneficial to liquidity during “normal” periods than 
during the crisis years (2008–2009) when volatility is high.  Our results also suggest that HFT 
are associated with increased volatility. 
HFTs’ impact on co-movement occurs for a number of reasons.  We estimate that around 
one-third of the increase in co-movement in returns is due to faster diffusion of market-wide 
information.  We attribute the other two-thirds of the increase in return co-movement to 
correlated trading strategies of HFTs, and to a lesser extent a habitat effect whereby large 
institutional investors are able to hold smaller stocks than previously due to the increased 
liquidity.  Similarly, we find that the habitat effect explains only a relatively small fraction of the 
increase in liquidity co-movement.  The tendency for HFT liquidity providers to withdraw from 
the market when conditions are unfavorable is a source of fragility that increases both volatility 
and co-movement in liquidity.  This effect is particularly pronounced during high volatility, such 
as during 2008–2009.  We estimate this component accounts for around one-fifth of the increase 
in liquidity co-movement.  Our results suggest the main drivers of the increase in liquidity co-
movement are the increased ability of HFT market markers to monitor conditions in other stocks 
and the correlated liquidity demand of opportunistic HFTs. 
Our results help paint a more complete picture of the effects of HFT, showing that some 
of the benefits of HFT, such as increased liquidity, are somewhat offset by an increase in co-
movement.  Co-movement affects the way shocks are transmitted between stocks and thus the 
level of systemic risk.  Higher co-movement also has implications for the cost of capital and thus 




returns and in liquidity is associated with cross-sectional return premiums that increase the cost 
of capital.  However, because HFT also increase the level of liquidity (which will tend to lower 
the cost of capital), HFT have two opposing effects on the costs of capital.  Which one dominates 







List of trading venues for which we consolidate data  
This table lists the trading venues for which we consolidate trades and quotes for our sample of stocks from 12 
countries.  
 
Exchange name Country  Exchange name Country 
Vienna SE Austria  Euronext Amsterdam Netherlands 
Euronext Brussels Belgium  Burgundy MTF Nordic Region 
Prague SE Czech Republic  Oslo SE Norway 
Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen Denmark  Warsaw SE Poland 
NYSE ARCA Europe  Euronext Lisbon Portugal 
Sigma X Europe  Bucharest SE Romania 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Finland  Russian Trading System Russia 
MONEP France  Saudi SE Saudi Arabia 
Euronext Paris France  Barcelona SE Spain 
Berlin SE Germany  Bilbao SE Spain 
RWB Germany  Madrid SE Spain 
Xetra Germany  Mercado Continuo Spain 
Frankfurt SE Germany  Valencia SE Spain 
Hamburg SE Germany  Nordic Growth Market Sweden 
Hanover SE Germany  Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Sweden 
Munich SE Germany  Berne SE Switzerland 
Stuttgart SE Germany  Scoach Switzerland Switzerland 
TradeGate SE Germany  Swiss Blue Chip Segment Switzerland 
Xetra International Market Germany  Istanbul SE Turkey 
Budapest SE Hungary  Equiduct United Kingdom 
Quote MTF Ltd Hungary  BATS Europe United Kingdom 
Irish SE Ireland  Channel Islands SE United Kingdom 
Tel Aviv SE Israel  Chi-X Europe United Kingdom 
Milan SE Italy  London SE United Kingdom 
Euro TLX Italy  PLUS Markets Group United Kingdom 
Luxembourg SE Luxembourg  Turquoise United Kingdom 
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Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
This table defines the variables calculated for each stock-day, 𝑖, 𝑡, and reports descriptive statistics.  The sample 
comprises 1,311 stocks from 12 European countries and spans the period February 1, 2007 to February 27, 2009, with a 
total of 674,307 stock-day observations.  Means of variables are calculated for the full sample (Pooled) as well as terciles 
of stocks based on EUR volume.  Terciles are constructed using country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are similar 
in the distribution of stocks from each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest (highest) average daily traded 
EUR volume during the sample period.  The standard deviation (SD) is calculated within time, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 . 
 
Variable Description 
Mean Mean Mean Mean SD 
Pooled T1 T2 T3 within 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡  Daily midquote return using consolidated 
quotes (bps) 
-20.83 -18.92 -22.45 -21.06 472.58 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 Price impact based liquidity measure, 
calculated as the negative log of 
Amihud’s ILLIQ (absolute return divided 
by traded EUR volume) 




 Time-weighted relative quoted spread for 
stock i in the consolidated order book 
(bps) 




 Time-weighted relative quoted spread for 
stock i on its home exchange (bps) 




 Time-weighted relative quoted spread for 
stock i on Chi-X (bps) 
79.30 137.85 101.16 50.40 83.57 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
  Daily number of trades in stock i 
consolidated across all venues  
1,468.67 195.10 709.07 3,555.90 1,401.25 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  Daily number of trades in stock i on its 
home exchange 
1,282.01 186.17 663.17 3,042.59 1,070.22 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑋 Daily number of trades in stock i on Chi-
X 
91.70 1.47 21.86 255.87 421.57 
𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
  Daily number of quote messages (‘000) 
in stock i’s consolidated order book (a 












ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 Daily number of quote messages (‘000) 
for stock i on its home exchange 
6.30 1.15 3.49 14.46 7.51 
𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑋 Daily number of quote messages (‘000) 
for stock i on Chi-X 
2.92 0.20 1.09 7.59 13.61 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
  Negative trading volume (‘00 EUR) 
scaled by the number of quote messages, 













ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  Negative trading volume (‘00 EUR) 
scaled by the number of quote messages, 












𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑋 Negative trading volume (‘00 EUR) 













  Daily number of quote messages scaled 
by the number of daily trades, 
consolidated across all venues (a proxy 
for HFT) 
18.25 25.88 17.77 11.78 69.36 
𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  Daily number of quote messages scaled 
by the number of daily trades, in the 












𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑋 Daily number of quote messages scaled 













Table 1 -  Continued 
Variable Description 
Mean Mean Mean Mean SD 
Total T1 T2 T3 within 
𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
  Daily traded EUR volume, consolidated across 
all venues (EUR million)  
33.20 1.52 8.12 91.42 45.61 
𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒  Daily traded EUR volume in the stock’s home 
exchange (EUR million) 
28.24 1.40 7.35 77.20 38.52 
𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑋 Daily traded EUR volume in Chi-X (EUR 
million) 
0.67 0.004 0.096 1.93 3.77 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺1𝑖,𝑡 Fragmentation proxy #1, calculated as the 
number of venues that execute trades during that 
stock-day 
3.57 1.99 2.97 5.80 1.77 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝑡 Fragmentation proxy #2, calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of traded EUR 
volume in each venue 
0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.10 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺3𝑖,𝑡 Fragmentation proxy #3, calculated as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the number of 
trades in each venue 
0.07 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 Fragmentation proxy #4, calculated as the EUR 
volume market share of all venues other than the 
home market (0 to 1) 
0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.13 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡  Inverse of the midquote for the consolidated 
order book at 4:30pm GMT 
0.26 0.36 0.27 0.14 0.41 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 Standard deviation of hourly intraday midquote 
returns (bps) 







Descriptive statistics on co-movement and market variables for all countries and terciles 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample, stock terciles based on average daily volume, and each of the 12 
countries.  Terciles are constructed using country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are similar in the distribution of stocks 
from each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest (highest) average daily traded EUR volume during the sample period.  
Countries are listed in descending order by their average level of co-movement in returns 𝑅𝑟
2.  The table reports the mean and 
standard deviation (SD) of co-movement in returns (𝑅𝑟
2), in price-impact based liquidity (𝑅𝐿𝐼𝑄
2 ), in quoted spreads (𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷
2 ), in 
daily volume (𝑅𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿
2 ), and in HFT activity (𝑅𝐻𝐹𝑇 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
2 ).  The last four columns report means of market returns (in bps), market 
liquidity (negative log of Amihud’s ILLIQ metric), market volatility (average monthly standard deviation of daily midquote 
returns in bps), and market-wide average traded volume (in EUR million per stock-day), calculated as equally weighted averages 
of the respective variable for all stocks in the sample.  Standard deviations (SD) are calculated within time, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
























 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Pooled 0.41 0.18  0.23 0.16  0.20 0.15  0.22 0.15  0.20 0.15 -20.52 -0.38 148.96 32.98 
Tercile 1 0.35 0.17  0.22 0.15  0.19 0.14  0.19 0.14  0.19 0.14 -20.86 -0.35 150.76 32.88 
Tercile 2 0.41 0.18  0.23 0.15  0.21 0.16  0.21 0.15  0.19 0.14 -20.34 -0.39 148.08 32.98 
Tercile 3 0.47 0.19  0.24 0.16  0.21 0.16  0.27 0.17  0.22 0.16 -20.37 -0.40 148.10 33.09 
Sweden 0.51 0.19  0.25 0.16  0.26 0.21  0.24 0.15  0.21 0.15 -25.67 -0.20 190.84 21.76 
France 0.51 0.19  0.21 0.14  0.21 0.18  0.27 0.17  0.23 0.16 -18.97 -0.04 161.78 79.53 
Germany 0.47 0.19  0.23 0.15  0.17 0.13  0.28 0.18  0.20 0.16 -20.94 -0.05 179.06 80.92 
UK 0.47 0.18  0.28 0.18  0.23 0.18  0.24 0.16  0.23 0.16 -19.74 -0.14 160.95 35.24 
Spain 0.41 0.19  0.21 0.15  0.18 0.13  0.21 0.15  0.19 0.14 21.55 -0.27 127.83 43.13 
Italy 0.39 0.21  0.26 0.17  0.21 0.16  0.22 0.14  0.20 0.14 -21.84 -0.09 175.30 45.24 
Norway 0.36 0.18  0.19 0.13  0.18 0.13  0.19 0.14  0.18 0.13 -24.23 -1.00 162.59 10.81 
Netherlands 0.36 0.18  0.16 0.12  0.17 0.12  0.20 0.14  0.17 0.13 -19.22 -0.67 130.58 27.62 
Denmark 0.35 0.18  0.20 0.14  0.20 0.14  0.19 0.13  0.18 0.13 -25.61 -0.67 119.63 5.69 
Finland 0.35 0.18  0.18 0.13  0.18 0.13  0.19 0.14  0.17 0.13 -18.72 -0.73 116.35 13.51 
Austria 0.28 0.17  0.24 0.15  0.18 0.14  0.21 0.16  0.18 0.13 -20.20 -0.71 125.92 3.49 







First-stage regressions of the impact of Chi-X on HFT and other variables 
This table reports the impact of Chi-X entry on HFT activity and other market characteristics.  The estimates are of 
𝛽 from the following regression model: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  is one of the dependent variables shown in the table (two HFT proxies, message traffic, volume, inverse 
midquote price, volatility, and fragmentation, all defined in Table 1), 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐶ℎ𝑖−𝑋 is a dummy variable equal to one when 
a stock is traded on Chi-X at that point in time and zero otherwise, and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are stock and time fixed effects. 
The regressions are performed on the whole panel and also separately for each tercile of stock by volume.  Terciles 
are constructed using country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are similar in the distribution of stocks from 
each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest (highest) average daily traded EUR volume during the sample 
period.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-stock autocorrelation. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample  𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 messagesi,t dvoli,t invmidquotei,t volatilityi,t 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝑡 
All 17.32*** 4.48** 31,346.11*** -10.88*** -0.07*** 11.13** 0.09*** 
T1  11.54*** 10.68*** 3,930.69*** -0.014 -0.12*** 9.26 0.04*** 
T2 8.08*** -0.51 11,330.19*** -1.50*** -0.003 2.38 0.07*** 







Second-stage regressions of the impact of HFT on co-movement 
This table reports results from second-stage regressions that analyze the impact of HFT on co-movement in stock 




= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2  denotes a co-movement measure for stock 𝑖 in month 𝜏, i.e., co-movement in returns (𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝑟
) in Panel A and co-
movement in liquidity (𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝐿𝐼𝑄
) in Panel B.  𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂  is the fitted value of HFT activity obtained from the first-stage 
regression. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 is a set of four control variables: a fragmentation proxy (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏), volume (𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏), 
volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏) and 1/midquote price (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏).  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝜏 are stock and time fixed effects.  The 
second-stage regressions are estimated for the pooled sample and for each tercile of stocks separately (T1-T3).  We 
construct terciles by volume, liquidity, and volatility, using country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are 
similar in the distribution of stocks from each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest (highest) average 
daily traded EUR volume (or liquidity or volatility) during the sample period.  The table reports slope coefficients 
(𝛽 and 𝛿𝑗, with the 𝛽 multiplied by 1,000) with t-statistics in parentheses.  Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-stock autocorrelation. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. F-
statistic from first-stage regressions test of instrumental relevance are in range from 10.9 to 194.4. The whole panel 
consists of 32,233 stock-month observations. 
 
   Control variables 
 Sample 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂  𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏 
Panel A: Impact of HFT on co-movement in returns, 𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝑟
 
 Pooled 7.197*** -189.035 -0.000 -0.184*** -40.692* 
  (3.551) (-1.345) (-0.475) (-2.677) (-1.800) 
 Volume terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 18.002*** -566.584* -0.000 -0.198** 35.244 
  (4.488) (-1.672) (-0.133) (-2.560) (1.365) 
 T2 20.146** -313.126 0.000 -0.288** -104.750*** 
  (2.464) (-1.138) (0.396) (-1.967) (-2.689) 
 T3 -3.550 -104.203 -0.000*** -0.139 -154.251 
  (-1.307) (-0.567) (-3.315) (-1.596) (-1.262) 
 Liquidity terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 15.678*** -779.854*** 0.000*** -0.247*** -2.982 
  (4.712) (-2.626) (4.506) (-3.132) (-0.129) 
 T2 11.204** -323.925 -0.000 -0.228*** -66.747* 
  (2.000) (-1.069) (-1.362) (-3.014) (-1.667) 
 T3 -4.972* -171.694 -0.000*** -0.024 -39.713 
  (-1.767) (-0.977) (-3.904) (-0.292) (-0.417) 
 Volatility terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 -1.312 371.978* -0.000*** 2.798*** 689.482** 
  (-0.521) (1.884) (-4.111) (3.109) (2.301) 
 T2 11.497*** -310.111 -0.000 1.252** -6.844 
  (2.835) (-1.145) (-0.800) (2.330) (-0.100) 
 T3 12.128*** -652.045** 0.000** -0.229*** -42.504* 





Table 4 – Continued 
 
   Control variables 
 Sample 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂  𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏 
Panel B: Impact of HFT on co-movement in liquidity, 𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝐿𝐼𝑄
 
 Pooled 13.481*** -290.734** 0.000*** -0.071 -20.534 
  (6.327) (-2.116) (5.185) (-1.352) (-1.085) 
 Volume terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 29.074*** -955.147*** 0.000*** -0.060*** 63.040** 
  (7.082) (-2.851) (4.659) (-2.932) (2.236) 
 T2 29.305*** -22.765 0.000*** 0.161 -139.605*** 
  (3.676) (-0.089) (3.219) (1.376) (-4.338) 
 T3 3.792 470.001*** 0.000 -0.079 -135.237 
  (1.364) (2.754) (0.845) (-0.999) (-1.279) 
 Liquidity terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 18.793*** -921.497*** 0.000*** -0.022 3.237 
  (5.534) (-2.629) (4.595) (-0.832) (0.132) 
 T2 30.746*** -733.249** -0.000*** 0.037 -79.255*** 
  (5.036) (-2.250) (-3.344) (0.400) (-3.342) 
 T3 2.756 422.866** 0.000 -0.013 -40.502 
  (0.970) (2.518) (0.545) (-0.139) (-0.460) 
 Volatility terciles (T1 – lowest) 
 T1 14.672*** -32.699 0.000*** 1.154 -517.857* 
  (5.014) (-0.155) (4.963) (1.326) (-1.699) 
 T2 10.952*** -46.917 0.000 0.769 49.798 
  (2.609) (-0.172) (1.414) (1.526) (0.805) 
 T3 13.965*** -780.954*** 0.000** -0.079 -28.066 







Second-stage regressions of the impact of HFT on other stock characteristics 
This table reports results from second-stage regressions that analyze the impact of HFT on various stock 
characteristics: 
𝑌𝑖,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
𝑌𝑖,𝜏 is one of the following dependent variables for stock 𝑖 in month 𝜏: average daily midquote return (𝑟𝑖,𝜏), average 
liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏), average relative quoted spread (𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝜏), and average volatility (standard deviation) of daily 
midquote returns (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏).  𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂   is the fitted value of HFT activity obtained from the first-stage regressions.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 is a set of four control variables: a fragmentation proxy (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏), volume (𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏), volatility 
(𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏) and 1/midquote (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏).  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝜏 are stock and time fixed effects.  The table reports slope 
coefficients (𝛽 and 𝛿𝑗) with t-statistics in parentheses.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-
stock autocorrelation. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent  Control variables 
variable 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂   𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏 
𝑟𝑖,𝜏 -0.217 18.966** 0.000 -0.003 -0.692 
 (-1.532) (2.067) (0.206) (-0.107) (-0.255) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏 0.019*** 0.581*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.024 
 (15.024) (7.310) (13.401) (-3.547) (0.694) 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝜏 -3.534*** -90.116*** 0.000*** 0.086** 45.170*** 
 (-11.903) (-5.000) (-10.417) (2.198) (4.934) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 2.841** -67.814* 0.000**  23.659*** 






Figure 1. Number of stocks traded on Chi-X through time.   
The graph illustrates the staggered introduction of Chi-X to European equity markets.  The vertical axis measures 
the number of stocks in each traded volume tercile of our sample traded on Chi-X on each day during the sample 
period.  Terciles are constructed using country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are similar in the distribution 
of stocks from each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest (highest) average daily traded EUR volume 








Figure 2. Daily number of quote messages.  
The graph shows the average number of quote messages (number of changes to the price or volume at the best 
quotes, measured each stock-day) through time for terciles of traded EUR volume.  Terciles are constructed using 
country-specific breakpoints to ensure terciles are similar in the distribution of stocks from each country.  T1 (T3) 









Figure 3. HFT activity through time.   
The graph shows HFT activity (ratio of negative trading volume (in ’00 EUR) to the number of quote messages) 
through time for terciles of traded EUR volume.  Terciles are constructed using country-specific breakpoints to 
ensure terciles are similar in the distribution of stocks from each country.  T1 (T3) contains stocks with the lowest 




























Figure 4. Direct and mediated effects of HFT on co-movement in returns.   
This graph depicts the results from multiple mediation analysis of the channels by which HFT impacts return co-





= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
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Figure 5. Direct and mediated effects of HFT on co-movement in liquidity.   
This graph depicts the results from multiple mediation analysis of the channels by which HFT impacts liquidity co-





= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
4
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝐿𝐼𝑄 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏 + 𝛽5𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂ + 𝛽3𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏 + 𝛽4𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
3
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 + 𝑖,𝜏  
where 𝑅𝑖,𝜏
2,𝐿𝐼𝑄
 is co-movement in liquidity, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝜏 is liquidity, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏 is volatility, 𝐻𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝜏̂  is the fitted value of 
HFT activity from the first-stage regressions that use Chi-X as an instrumental variable, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑖,𝜏 is a set of four 
control variables: a fragmentation proxy (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐺2𝑖,𝜏), volume (𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝜏), volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝜏) and the inverse of 
the midquote price (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝜏).  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝜏 are stock and time fixed effects.  The percentages refer to the 







Total effect (100%) 





Direct effect (76.0%) 
𝛽5 = 10.27*** 
Liquidity 
(5.1%) 
Volatility 
(18.8%) 
